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the Right to Privacy: Core Constitutional
Features, Defining Citizens’ Interests,
and the Implications of Biometric
Identification in the United States
MADISON JULIA LEVINE*
In 2009, the Indian government introduced a widespread
biometric identification system called Aadhaar—a national
scheme that issues Indian citizens and residents a unique
identification number while collecting and storing their most
personal biometric and demographic information. As the
Aadhaar system was implemented and promoted in India,
widespread concerns grew regarding the storage and protection of such private information. How can Indian citizens
enforce and protect their privacy rights? In 2017, the Indian
Supreme Court attempted to address this issue by holding
that an individual’s right to privacy is an inherent part of the
right to life and personal liberty and is therefore implied under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
*
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Following the Supreme Court of India’s declaration that
privacy is a fundamental right, the idea of a general-purpose
identification database is constitutionally questionable. As
there is no comprehensive legal framework for privacy protection and no explicit constitutional right to privacy in India, one must ask: is the Indian government violating individual privacy rights through Aadhaar? Regardless of this
concern, in 2018 the Indian Supreme Court declared
Aadhaar constitutional in connection to the mandatory linking of Aadhaar numbers with all government welfare
schemes and services. In light of this decision, this Comment
advocates that the Aadhaar system should have been deemed
unconstitutional as a violation of individual privacy rights.
Additionally, with the growth of interconnected technology, it is important to address the consequences of a system
like Aadhaar in the United States. How would a similar identification system function and would such a system even be
deemed constitutional? To maintain a liberal democratic society that values and upholds privacy rights, the United
States should avoid proposing such a system, no matter how
beneficial or convenient it may seem.
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INTRODUCTION
The right to privacy was characterized in the United States during the late nineteenth century simply as the “right to be let alone.”1
Since then, the right to privacy has expanded into something much
greater due to—among other sociopolitical changes—emerging
technology and information systems, which have wrought a complex set of issues that illuminate the core definitional features of privacy in the twenty-first century.2 Alan Westin, a scholar who surveyed and set the boundaries of privacy under the United States
Constitution for a half-century, said that “[p]rivacy is the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”3 In 1989, the United States Supreme Court stated
that privacy is one’s “control over information concerning his or her
person.”4 Similarly, President Bill Clinton’s National Information
Infrastructure Task Force defined privacy as “an individual's claim
to control the terms under which personal information—information
identifiable to the individual—is acquired, disclosed, and used.”5 By
any definition today, privacy includes the “ability of an individual
or a group to seclude themselves or information about themselves
and thereby reveal themselves selectively.”6 Accordingly, the definition that will be used throughout this Comment to encompass privacy rights in the modern international system can be stated as follows: privacy is the right to control the dissemination of personal
1

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 205 (1890).
2
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (Puttaswamy I), Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, 1 (Sup. Ct. India Aug. 24, 2017) (describing
issues such as data mining, data collection, algorithms, internet browsing, and
online banking). A subsequent Indian Supreme Court decision was reached in
2018 and is referred to as Puttaswamy II.
3
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see Karen Sparks, Alan
Furman Westin, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alan-Westin (last updated Dec. 14, 2018); see also Tabrez Ahmad et al.,
Right of Privacy: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Responses in USA and India,
Particularly in Cyber Age 11 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440665.
4
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 763 (1989).
5
Ahmad et al., supra note 3, at 11.
6
Id. at 2.
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information.
This Comment addresses two primary questions. First, does India’s biometric identification system violate constitutional privacy
protection? Second, what are the implications of enacting a similar
system in the United States? There is also the related issue of what
occurs when one cannot control the dissemination of personal information. How will our privacy rights be protected and upheld? This
Comment approaches these questions and issues in the context of
India’s Aadhaar scheme—a national identification system that issues Indian citizens and residents a unique ID number while collecting and storing their most personal biometric and demographic information.7
This Comment advocates for new, comprehensive privacy protections under Indian law in light of the 2017 Indian Supreme Court
decision Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Puttaswamy I), which upheld the right to privacy as fundamental under the Constitution of
India.8 Part I of this Comment discusses privacy rights under the
Indian Constitution, including previous and current case law addressing this issue. Part II explores privacy rights under the United
States Constitution and prior jurisprudence that developed this topic,
as well as alternative views on constitutional interpretation. Part III
highlights the specific issues associated with Aadhaar ID cards, including the pros and cons of the personal identification system. Part
IV analyzes the constitutionality of current Aadhaar legislation in
India and suggests changes in the law. Finally, Part V explores the
implications and consequences of implementing a similar national
identification system in the United States.
I. CORE PRIVACY RIGHTS UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
Fundamental rights such as life, dignity, personal liberty, happiness, and freedom arise out of societal custom and are memorialized
in constitutions and legislation.9 Such rights have been described as
basic, primordial, or inalienable rights and in modern democratic

7

See infra Part III.
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 1, 262–63 (Sup. Ct.
India Aug. 24, 2017; see infra Part I.
9
See Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 23 (Bobde, J.,
concurring).
8
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countries, cannot be “abridged or curtailed totally by ordinary legislation” or the acts of elected officials.10 The framers of the Constitution of India believed that liberty cannot be fully enjoyed without
the guarantee of certain freedoms.11 The very purpose of creating a
written Indian Constitution was to “secure justice, liberty, and
equality to the people of India.”12
As such, the Constitution of India contains provisions “specifying and identifying certain rights” for its citizens.13 In attempting to
understand and solidify these essential rights, it is important to look
to the written text of the Constitution for a deeper understanding.14
Such freedoms can be found in the words of the Preamble and Part
III (Fundamental Rights) of the Indian Constitution, which includes
Articles 14, 19, and 21.15 These Articles enumerate a specific and
precise list of rights, including the following: the right to equal protection,16 freedom of speech and expression, freedom of movement,17 life, and personal liberty.18 Nevertheless, an exact constitutional provision containing a fundamental right of privacy is lacking,
creating a discord of court opinions concerning the privacy rights of

10

Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 22–23 (Chelameswar, J., concurring).
11
Id. at 24.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 22.
14
See id. at 21.
15
INDIA CONST. pmbl. (“We, the People of India, having solemnly resolved
to constitute India into a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic and to
secure to all its citizens: Justice, social, economic, and political; Liberty of
thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; Equality of status and opportunity;
and to promote among them all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual
and the unity and integrity of the Nation.”); id. art. 14 (“The State shall not deny
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India.”); id. art. 19 (“All citizens shall have the right to freedom of
speech and expression; to assemble peaceably and without arms; to form associations or unions or co-operative societies; to move freely through the territory of
India; to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and to practice any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.”); id. art. 21 (“No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”).
16
Id. art. 14.
17
Id. art. 19.
18
Id. art. 21.
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Indian citizens.19
However, on August 24, 2017, the Indian Supreme Court decision in Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Puttaswamy I)20 brought
some clarity to the issue of fundamental privacy rights. Prior to Puttaswamy I, there was a general understanding of an implied right to
privacy in India, but its boundaries remained imprecise.21 For example, the ancient and religious texts of India contained a well-developed sense of privacy.22 In the Ramayana (an ancient Indian epic
poem), a woman should not be seen by a male stranger, and the Grihya Sutras (sacred Hindu texts concerning domestic rituals) describe
the correct way to build one’s home to protect privacy.23 Members
of one particular Hindu denomination, known as the Ramanuj Sampradaya, refuse to eat or drink in the presence of others.24 Despite
the evident historical emphasis on privacy, the Court in Puttaswamy
I solidified this legal issue by holding that an individual’s right to
privacy is an inherent part of the right to life and personal liberty
and therefore is implied in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.25
In the judgment, Justice Chandrachud declared that privacy is an
intrinsic right to life and liberty.26 This judgment arose as a reaction
to the overarching presence of state and private actors attempting to
regulate individual freedoms.27 There was a need to address privacy
19

Ujwala Uppaluri & Varsha Shivanagowda, Preserving Constitutive Values
in the Modern Panopticon: The Case for Legislating Toward a Privacy Right in
India, 5 NUJS L. REV. 21, 33, 42–44 (2012).
20
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012.
21
Graham Greenleaf, Confusion as Indian Supreme Court Compromises on
Data Privacy and ID Number, 137 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 24, 24–26
(2015).
22
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 21 (Bobde, J., concurring).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 262 (majority opinion) (“Privacy is a constitutionally protected right which emerges primarily from
the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution.”); INDIA
CONST. art. 21. (stating that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law”.)
26
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 262–63; Right to
Privacy a Fundamental Right, Says Supreme Court in Unanimous Verdict, WIRE
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://thewire.in/170303/supreme-court-aadhaar-right-to-privacy/.
27
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 4–5.
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rights in the context of the changing technological landscape of India, where the debate on privacy was “being analyzed [within] the
context of a global information based society.”28 The task before the
Court was to “impart constitutional meaning to individual liberty in
an interconnected world.”29 As Justice Chelameswar stated in his
concurring opinion, “fundamental rights are the only constitutional
firewall to prevent [state] interference with those core freedoms constituting liberty of a human being.”30 His concurrence concluded by
emphasizing that the right to privacy is a core freedom and is part of
the meaning of liberty within Article 21.31
The Puttaswamy I judgment recognized the importance and
value of privacy as a constitutional entitlement, not through the process of amendment, but through judicial interpretation by determining the nature and the extent of the freedoms available to each person protected under the Indian Constitution.32 The Court looked to
Article 21 to interpret and establish this fundamental right.33 Justice
Chandrachud explained that the right to privacy is implicit in the
right to life and liberty guaranteed to citizens by Article 21 and that
citizens have a right to safeguard that privacy.34 Justice Bobde further expounded that the original and proper home for a right of privacy is in Article 21 at the very core of personal liberty and life itself.35 He stated that “[l]iberty and privacy are integrally connected
in a way that privacy is often the basic condition necessary for exercise of the right of personal liberty.”36 Earlier in the opinion, Justice Bobde asserted that an individual must ensure his or her privacy
in order to experience fulfillment and happiness and to perform at
the highest level.37
The Court also turned to the Preamble of the Indian Constitution
28

Id.
Id.
30
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 40 (Chelameswar,
J., concurring).
31
Id. at 40–41.
32
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 109–10 (majority
opinion).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 51–52.
35
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 25 (Bobde, J., concurring).
36
Id.
37
See id. at 23.
29
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in interpreting privacy as a fundamental right.38 In reference to the
Preamble, Chief Justice Khehar explained “the constitutional vision seeks the realization of justice (social, economic and political);
liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship); equality
(as a guarantee against arbitrary treatment of individuals); and fraternity (which assures a life of dignity to every individual).”39 The
principles enumerated in the Preamble exist cohesively to “facilitate
a humane and compassionate society.”40 By focusing on human dignity in realizing fundamental individual rights, the “collective wellbeing of the community is determined,” ensuring that Indian society
is a reflection of dignity, fairness, liberty, and justice.41 Chief Justice
Khehar claimed that such reflections are also found in Article 14
(equal protection), Article 19 (guarantees of freedom), and Article
21 (the right to life and personal liberty) of the Constitution.42
Justice Sapre further explored this concept, stating that the significance of the Preamble was to focus on two aspects—first, “the
unity of the Nation” and second, the “dignity of the individual.”43
Both expressions are interdependent and intertwined in that the Nation is required to respect the freedom and ability to attain self-fulfillment of every individual.44 Dignity of both the individual and the
Nation is considered essential to the fraternity of the Indian people.45
Justice Sapre found no difficulty in tracing the right to privacy as
emanating from two expressions of the Preamble: “liberty of
thought, expression, belief, faith and worship” and “fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual.”46 Additionally, he also found that
the right to privacy emanates from Article 19(1)(a), which gives to
every citizen “a freedom of speech and expression,” Article
19(1)(d), which gives to every citizen “a right to move freely
38
39

INDIA CONST. pmbl.
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 94 (majority opin-

ion).
40

Id.
Id.
42
INDIA CONST. arts. 14, 19, 21; Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494
of 2012 at 94.
43
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 6 (Sapre, J., concurring).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 7.
46
Id. at 19.
41
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throughout the territory of India,” and finally, from the expression
“personal liberty” under Article 21.47 The right to privacy is intertwined with these expressions and “flows from each of them and in
juxtaposition.”48
Importantly, the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in Puttaswamy I overruled the holdings of the 1954 case M.P. Sharma v.
Satish Chandra and the 1962 case Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, both of which were landmark decisions holding that the
right to privacy is not protected under the Indian Constitution.49 In
M.P. Sharma, the Indian government seized documents belonging
to a company suspected of falsifying records.50 Sharma challenged
the constitutional validity of the search and seizure, claiming that it
violated his fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f), the right to
acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and Article 20(3), protection
against self-incrimination.51 The Court in M.P. Sharma held that in
the absence of a provision similar to the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, the right to privacy could not be read
into the provisions of Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution.52 Although Article 19(1)(f) was also in question, the Court only rejected
the right to privacy in the context of searches and seizures of documents.53 The Court took a narrow and formalistic approach, stating

47

Id.
Id. at 20.
49
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 261 (majority opinion); M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi (1954) 1 SCR
1077, 1096–97 (India); Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332, 351
(India).
50
M.P. Sharma, 1 SCR at 1079–80; Ananthakrishnan G, M P Sharma and
Kharak Singh: The Cases in Which SC Ruled on Privacy, INDIAN EXPRESS (July
19, 2017), http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/m-p-sharma-and-kharaksingh-the-cases-in-which-sc-ruled-on-privacy-4756964/.
51
M.P. Sharma, 1 SCR at 1080–81 (discussing INDIA CONST. arts. 19, 20).
52
INDIA CONST. art. 20, § 3; Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of
2012 at 261; see Gautam Bhatia, State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy in
India: A Constitutional Biography, 26 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 127, 130 (2014).
53
See Bhatia, supra note 52, at 128. But see Govind v. State of M.P., (1975)
3 SCR 946, 951–56 (suggesting that there is a zone of privacy that is protected
under the Indian Constitution).
48
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that India has no equivalent of the American Fourth Amendment’s
specific prohibition of unlawful searches.54
The decision in M.P. Sharma did not specifically adjudicate
whether a right to privacy would arise from any other constitutional
provision such as the rights guaranteed by Article 19 or Article 21.55
The decision only held that a right to privacy cannot be read into the
Indian Constitution under Article 20(3).56 Accordingly, the holding
could not be interpreted to specifically exclude the protection of privacy under the framework of constitutional guarantees including
those in Articles 19 or 21.57 M.P. Sharma left undetermined whether
a constitutional right to privacy is protected by other provisions of
the Indian Constitution, leaving room for future judicial interpretation.58 Therefore, in the absence of an express constitutional guarantee of privacy, the Court could still consider whether privacy is an
element of personal liberty, a part of human dignity, or understood
within the protection of human life.59
In Kharak Singh, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality
of police monitoring.60 After being released from custody for lack
of evidence, the petitioner was placed under police surveillance,
which included unannounced home visits, movement reports, and
periodic inquiries into his communications.61 Singh challenged the
constitutionality of the surveillance, claiming that it violated his fundamental rights of freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d) and
the protection of life an personal liberty under Article 21.62 The
Court held that the content of the expression “life and personal liberty” under Article 21 is a guarantee against intrusion into personal
54

Bhatia, supra note 52, at 128; Sheetal Asrani-Dann, The Right to Privacy
in the Era of Smart Governance: Concerns Raised by the Introduction of Biometric-Enabled National ID Cards in India, 47 J. INDIAN L. INST. 53, 62 (2005).
55
INDIA CONST. art. 19 (protecting freedom of speech and expression, the
ability to move freely through the territory of India, and to practice any profession,
or to carry on any occupation, trade or business); Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 262 (majority opinion).
56
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 262.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332, 336 (India); Ananthakrishnan G, supra note 50.
61
Kharak Singh, 1 SCR at 337–39; Ananthakrishnan G, supra note 50.
62
Kharak Singh, 1 SCR at 336.
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security.63 The Court further held that unauthorized entrance into a
person’s home is a violation of that fundamental right to personal
liberty.64 However, the Court refused to accept an infringement of
Article 19, stating that unannounced visits did not impede Singh’s
movements, and therefore did not abridge his personal liberty or privacy.65
As such, the second part of the decision in Kharak Singh, which
invalidated home visits on the ground that they violated personal
liberty under Article 21, seems to be an implicit recognition of the
right to privacy.66 However, the first part of the decision, emphasizing that the right to privacy is not a guaranteed right under the Indian
Constitution, invalidates the right to privacy as a fundamental freedom.67
The 2017 Supreme Court decision in Puttaswamy I,68 which directly addresses whether the right to privacy is a fundamental right
under the Indian Constitution, overrules both M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh, creating a new stage on which to analyze and adjudicate
privacy issues in India.
II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Similar to the Indian Constitution, the United States Constitution
does not contain an explicit right to privacy.69 However, the development of American jurisprudence has revealed that the right to privacy is implicitly protected under several Amendments to the
United States Constitution.70
63

Id. at 348–51; Bhatia, supra note 52, at 130.
Kharak Singh, 1 SCR at 348–51.
65
Id. at 343–44.
66
Id. at 348–51; Bhatia, supra note 52, at 130.
67
Kharak Singh, 1 SCR at 348–51; see MP Sharma and Kharak Singh’s
Case: ‘Privacy Not a Fundamental Right’ Supreme Court Had Held Decades
Ago, FIRST POST (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.firstpost.com/india/mp-sharma-and
-kharak-singhs-case-privacy-not-a-fundamental-right-supreme-court-had-helddecades-ago-3966467.html.
68
Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 1, 261 (Sup. Ct. India
Aug. 24, 2017).
69
Id. at 141; Uppaluri & Shivanagowda, supra note 19, at 33.
70
See generally Todd B. Ruback & Sarah Mahony, An Overview of Recent
Statutory Changes to Privacy Law in India in Comparison to Similar US and EU
Privacy Rules, N.J. LAW. MAG., Oct. 2011, at 48, 48; Uppaluri & Shivanagowda,
supra note 19, at 34.
64
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The 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut was one of the earliest
privacy cases before the United States Supreme Court.71 Griswold
brought a constitutional challenge of a state law that forbade the use
of contraceptives.72 The Court found that even though the right to
privacy is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it emanates
from the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches.73 The
Court also held that the right to privacy is protected under the First,
Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.74 These Amendments create a
zone in which privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.75
Griswold is similar to the 1975 Indian Supreme Court case of
Govind v. State of M.P.,76 which also recognized a “penumbra or
zone of privacy” under the Indian Constitution.77 Govind challenged
the constitutional validity of state surveillance and unannounced
home visits.78 The Court held that Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian
Constitution created an independent right to privacy and the “fundamental nature of [this] right is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”79 Yet, the Indian Supreme Court did not go so far as to specifically declare privacy an inherent right, as was pronounced in
Puttaswamy I and as the United States Supreme Court pronounced
in Griswold, but did indicate that a fundamental privacy right could
be overridden by a compelling state interest.80
The 1967 decision in Katz v. United States also broadened the
interpretation of the right to privacy in the United States Constitu-

71

381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); Uppaluri & Shivanagowda, supra note 19, at 34.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
73
Id. at 484.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 485.
76
(1975) 3 SCR 946 (India).
77
Id. at 947; Asrani-Dann, supra note 54, at 63.
78
Asrani-Dann, supra note 54, at 63.
79
Govind, 3 SCR at 954.
80
See Bhatia, supra note 52, at 134. Govind set the tone for future Indian
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union
of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301 (holding that improper wiretapping implicates Article
21 of the Indian Constitution, violating personal liberty and the right to privacy).
72
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tion, with specific emphasis on the Fourth Amendment and governmental intrusion.81 Previous case law in the area of government surveillance was based on Olmstead v. United States, which interpreted
the Fourth Amendment to apply only to an actual physical examination of one’s person, papers, tangible effects, or home.82 However,
as the common law notion of privacy shifted from a physical- and
property-based understanding to a personal liberty understanding,
there was a reexamination and reinterpretation of the Constitution,
specifically Fourth Amendment protections.83 Katz established the
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” illuminated in Justice Harlan’s
concurrence, which built off Justice Stewart’s majority opinion:
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.” The question, however, is what protection it
affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a “place.”
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from
prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
“reasonable.”84
Following the Katz decision, the United States Supreme Court
heard a number of cases to determine the extent that state actors may
intrude upon an individual’s privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that the thermal imaging of
a house is a violation of the Amendment.85 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia stated that the sanctity of the home is always protected, as was originally intended by the Fourth Amendment.86
While the decision in Katz may have expanded the understanding of

81

389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
82
277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
83
Asrani-Dann, supra note 54, at 54–55.
84
Katz, 389 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
86
Id.
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the Fourth Amendment to include a reasonable expectation of privacy, the majority believed it did not supplant the original intention
of the Amendment—to secure people in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”87
In addressing the concerns with government surveillance and
monitoring, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
Jones, held that GPS monitoring of a vehicle constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment.88 GPS monitoring allows the government to create a comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflect a great amount of detail about “her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual association.”89 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that “physical intrusion is
now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance” and allowing the
government to track a vehicle’s movements through GPS may “alter
the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”90
Perhaps most telling of the United States Supreme Court’s view
on surveillance and data gathering in an era of increased technology
is the 2014 case of Riley v. California.91 There, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that a warrantless search and seizure of digital
contents of a cell phone was unconstitutional.92 Cell phones contain
much more information than just a record of outgoing and incoming
calls; they contain photographs, video tapes, address books, emails,
bank records, browsing histories, and voicemails.93 As a result, the
Court believed that allowing state actors to conduct a search of a
person’s entire cell phone would be like “ransacking his house for
everything which may incriminate him” instead of just searching his
pockets.94
In addition to the Fourth Amendment line of cases defining privacy, the Court developed the right to privacy in other areas as well;
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perhaps most controversial is its decision in Roe v. Wade.95 This
case dealt with the question of abortion and a woman’s liberty under
the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments.96 The Fourteenth Amendment prevents the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, while the Ninth Amendment
protects the unenumerated rights of the United States Constitution
(rights that may exist aside from those explicitly mentioned).97 In
Roe, Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion and held that
[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. . . . This right of privacy, whether it be founded
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel
it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.98
In Roe, the Court found roots in the Constitution that protect the
right to privacy: the First Amendment, the Bill of Rights, the Ninth
Amendment, and the concept of liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.99 This analysis is analogous to the decision in
Puttaswamy I,100 where Article 21 of the Indian Constitution was
interpreted to include the right to privacy under the right of life and
personal liberty. Although the word “privacy” is not mentioned in
either the Indian or the United States Constitutions, the courts of
both countries have not only recognized the right to privacy under
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various amendments and articles, but they have also extended the
scope of protection under the right to privacy.101
As demonstrated, constitutions and judicial interpretation evolve
over time as specific issues and entitlements come to the forefront
of the demands for justice.102 Constitutional developments have occurred as constitutional texts are interpreted to address new concerns
that require an “expansive reading of liberties and freedoms to preserve human rights under the rule of law.”103
India’s and the United States’s experiences with oppressive regimes104 is a reminder of how precious the rights to life and liberty
truly are. It is the role of the judiciary to be vigilant in interpreting
the meaning of constitutional text, as constitutions have evolved and
continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges.105 The
draftsmen of both the Indian and United States Constitutions were
influenced by a sense of history that enriched the development and
adoption of the documents.106 Further, as seen in previously mentioned case law, the concept of fundamental rights, such as the issue
of privacy intertwined with liberty and dignity, has evolved over the
course of constitutional history in both countries.107
Still, no past generation could possibly foresee the many problems that contemporary societies face, even with a rich sense of historical understanding of the meaning of life and liberty.108 Therefore, constitutions should be interpreted with flexibility instead of
limiting their meanings to the confines of their drafting date.109 As
Chief Justice Khehar eloquently put it, “above all, constitutional interpretation is but a process in achieving justice, liberty, and dignity
101
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Was the American Revolution Inevitable?, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/
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to every citizen.”110 Therefore, as society evolves, so must constitutional doctrine.
This is particularly relevant where judicial interpretation is influenced by a technological age that has the ability to reshape our
primary understanding of “information, knowledge, and human relationships that was unknown even in the recent past.”111 As new
challenges to privacy arise, courts must leave room for interpretation; today’s problems “have to be adjudged by a vibrant application
of constitutional doctrine and cannot be frozen by a vision suited to
a radically different society.”112 Technological growth is so rapid
that it renders advances of a few years ago obsolete.113 The only way
to maintain a relevant and applicable constitution is to view it as a
living instrument capable of reinterpretation and reevaluation by applying the principles on which it was founded in light of societal
change.
III. INDIA’S AADHAAR SYSTEM: A SPECIFIC PRIVACY ISSUE
A. The Aadhaar System
The need for additional legal analysis of privacy rights is evident
with the growth and development of technology, which has created
new mechanisms for the possible invasion of privacy by the state,
such as “surveillance, profiling, and data collection.”114 Countries
are increasing their use of technology in light of “global terrorist
attacks and heightened public safety concerns.”115 Digital footprints
and wide-ranging data can be analyzed to reveal “patterns, trends,
and associations, especially relating to human behavior and interactions.”116 Along with these advancements in technology come new
concerns of how such sensitive information is going to be dissemi-
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nated and processed by the government, especially as engineers develop more effective algorithms and greater computational
power.117
At the forefront of the data collection debate is the Aadhaar card.
Initiated in 2009, Aadhaar is a twelve-digit number issued by the
Unique Identification Authority of India (“UIDAI”) to Indian residents.118 Any individual, regardless of age or social status, may register for an Aadhaar number free of charge.119 The applicant must
provide demographic information (name, date of birth, age, gender,
address, mobile number, and email) and biometric information (fingerprints, iris scan, and facial photograph).120
Aadhaar is a “strategic policy tool for social and financial inclusion, public sector delivery reforms, managing fiscal budgets, [increasing] convenience and [promoting] hassle-free people-centric
governance [that] facilitates financial inclusion of the underprivileged and weaker sections of the society.”121 One of Aadhaar’s goals
is to create a national identity system that can work across state, language, and database barriers, giving an identity to the most marginalized and vulnerable of populations.122 Millions of impoverished
Indian citizens lack governmentally recognized identities, preventing them from gaining access to cell phones, lines of credit, bank
accounts, or government aid.123 With an Aadhaar ID, those lacking
identification are now able to directly apply for housing subsidies,
healthcare, and food through bank account deposits.124 Aadhaar can
be used in the delivery of food, employment, education,125 social
117
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security, bank accounts,126 or healthcare, by allowing the agency or
service provider to contact the central Unique Identification database to confirm a beneficiary’s identity.127 To date, 1.09 billion people across India have obtained an Aadhaar identity.128
B. Pros of the Aadhaar System
One of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s policy goals is
to extend Aadhaar to every Indian citizen as a method to prove his
or her identity and access governmental and financial services.129
The Aadhaar system will benefit the poorest members of Indian society by providing direct access to government services such as food
grains, cash subsidies, employment wages, education, health benefits, or LPG (cooking fuel) distribution.130 Direct distribution will
eliminate the problem of corrupt middlemen who enter false names
into welfare databases to collect money intended for the poor.131 The
poor, who often lack identifying paperwork, such as proof of address
or birth certificates, will now be able to apply for telecom services
and passports, facilitating movement and communication throughout the country.132 As a result, people living at the bottom of the
socio-economic pyramid can participate in the marketplace and enjoy the benefits of having a government identity.133
126
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Additionally, Aadhaar cards will facilitate banking and entrepreneurial endeavors.134 UIDAI will be able to secure money transactions through MicroATMs and mobile phones in rural areas of India.135 Banks will be able to link their permanent account numbers
with Aadhaar numbers, making it easier for people to open bank accounts without extensive identity documentation.136 Linking one’s
bank account with Aadhaar can help to ensure direct and transparent
transfers of subsidies, weed out false beneficiaries, and reduce tax
evasion.137
Aadhaar can provide a secure and reliable authentication service
for companies and entrepreneurs to facilitate market transactions.138
For example, Aadhaar users are able to pay for goods with their fingerprint or ID numbers.139 The Indian Central Bank has introduced
outposts in rural grocery stores and other small business operations.140 Merchants at these outposts are equipped with smartphones
and small fingerprint scanners that link their bank accounts to their
Aadhaar numbers.141 Customers enter their Aadhaar number and
bank name into the smart phone and then scan one of their fingers.142
After authentication, the amount owed is directly credited to the
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merchant’s bank account.143 This form of payment will not only facilitate commerce in rural areas, but will also assist farm workers
and merchants in entering the formal banking system, helping them
develop their credit history and allowing them to apply for loans.144
C. Cons of the Aadhaar System
This large-scale, centralized collection, storage, and use of an
individual’s demographic and biometric information has serious privacy implications, especially considering that India lacks any type
of comprehensive privacy law or independent oversight agency.145
Many fear that having one universal ID number will allow government or private actors to discover sensitive demographic and biometric information.146 In fact, there have already been incidents of
hacking the UIDAI system and stealing Aadhaar information.147Anonymous sellers having been using the WhatsApp mobile application to provide unrestricted access to information from
more than one billion Aadhaar numbers.148 For a fee of 500 Rupees
(around eight U.S. dollars), anyone can gain access to an individual’s name, address, date of birth, photo, personal identification
number, phone number, and email address.149 Once Aadhaar information is obtained, hackers use the numbers to print duplicate
Aadhaar cards to link SIM cards and bank accounts of unsuspecting
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users, most likely leading to identity theft.150 Ironically, Aadhaar
was developed by the government as a method to combat corruption
and prevent false identification and fraud.151
Despite the recent hacking incidents,152 UIDAI continues to
claim that biometric information is encrypted at the source and “unauthorized sharing and leakage of the data does not happen.”153
UIDAI denied the media reports of any information hacking, stating
the news articles were a “case of misreporting” and claiming that
“Aadhaar data, including biometric information, is fully safe and secure.”154 UIDAI claims that having access to someone’s Aadhaar
number does not pose a threat because an individual’s iris or fingerprints are also necessary for successful identification;155 a mere display of demographic information cannot be misused without biometrics.156 However, this has been shown to be untrue, as identity
fraud is still occurring without the need for biometric authentication.157 Conmen can print duplicate ID cards to use at airports or
withdraw funds by linking bank accounts with Aadhaar numbers or
phone numbers.158 Despite UIDAI’s denial of data hacking, the recent media reports regarding Aadhaar bring to light the issue of data
security as an aspect of privacy rights and may hinder UIDAI’s goal
of extending Aadhaar to every Indian citizen.159
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UIDAI claims to protect users and their information160 by
providing a secure and encrypted database, providing strict security
and storage protocols, penalizing anyone who tampers with data or
gains unauthorized access, and collecting limited data (no information concerning religion, caste, community, class, ethnicity, income, or health is collected).161 However, there is little legal framework in India to protect Aadhaar users from data breaches.162 Because there are no comprehensive privacy laws in India, the activities of the state are regulated through “sector-specific laws and the
jurisprudential development of the right to privacy.”163
The only effective legislation governing security and cybercrime in India is the Information Technology (Amendment) Act,
2008.164 The sole provision addressing the privacy of personal information is section 72A, which “prescribes a penalty for breach of
privacy of an electronic record, but only applies to authorities exercising power under the Act,” not to private individuals who may
gain access to information illegally.165 Section 43 of the Information
Technology Act requires that corporations maintain “reasonable security practices and procedures,” defined as procedures intended to
protect information from “unauthorized access, damage, use, modification, disclosure or impairment.”166 However, the Information
Technology Act gives corporations the freedom to determine which
procedures they will implement in protecting confidential information, which may lead to the use of minimum data protection
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standards and lack of third-party oversight.167 As discussed, there
are many cons to the Aadhaar system not just in its existence, but
also in its application to the right to privacy.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AADHAAR SYSTEM
As there is no comprehensive legal framework for privacy protection and no explicit constitutional right to privacy in India,168 one
must ask: is the Indian government violating individual privacy
rights through Aadhaar? Following the Supreme Court of India’s
declaration that privacy is a fundamental right,169 the idea of a general-purpose identification database is constitutionally questionable.170 Determining privacy as a constitutionally protected right has
laid the foundation for more specific challenges to
various architectural and implementational aspects
of Aadhaar, and its impact on privacy—such as the
mandatory collection of biometric data, deployment
of private players for collection of information,
online authentication and the extent of authentication
data storage, and the possibility of data convergence
and profiling as a result of Aadhaar-seeding of various databases.171
A. The Aadhaar Act 2016
The Aadhaar Act 2016 (“the Act” or “the Aadhaar Act”), a
money bill passed by the Parliament of India, aims to provide legal
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backing to the Aadhaar project.172 The Act describes the Aadhaar
enrollment process, authentication procedures, the organizational
structure of UIDAI, methods for the protection of information, and
offenses and penalties. 173 The Act places UIDAI in charge of securing identity information, authenticating records, and implementing
“appropriate technical and organisational security measures.”174
There are restrictions in place that regulate the sharing of information with third parties, with an exception for the disclosure of information “made in the interest of national security.”175
However, the Act was met with controversy, as section 7 specifies that the government may “require” an individual to enroll in
Aadhaar to obtain government subsidies or services.176 For example,
a 2016 finance bill has made Aadhaar mandatory for filing tax returns and obtaining a permanent bank account number.177 The Indian Supreme Court has directed that Aadhaar cannot be compulsory for beneficiaries or as a precondition to access welfare programs.178 Initially, the Aadhaar project was presented to the public
as a voluntary program;179 however, Aadhaar has now become man-
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datory for an ever-widening range of services such as salary payments, pensions, school enrollment and scholarships, filing income
tax returns, and other welfare schemes.180
Nevertheless, the Indian Supreme Court has pushed against
making Aadhaar mandatory for certain services.181 Specifically,
there are currently a handful of petitions challenging the government’s decision to make Aadhaar cards mandatory for government
services and welfare schemes, claiming the mandatory linking of
Aadhaar numbers to bank accounts and cell phones is illegal and
unconstitutional.182 On September 26, 2018, the Indian Supreme
Court ruled on some of these petitions, declaring the mandatory
linking of Aadhaar numbers with all government welfare schemes
and services to be constitutional, while linking Aadhaar numbers
with private services such as bank accounts, employee pension
plans, or cell phone SIM cards cannot be a requirement.183 Similar
to a 2015 interim order where the Indian Supreme Court struck down
the mandatory requirement of Aadhaar for private services,184 the
2018 judgment will restrict Aadhaar’s mandatory usage to government services only.185
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B. Information Collection and the Legality of the Aadhaar Act
A primary concern is that the requirement of Aadhaar will result
in mass surveillance by the government, possibly leading to
breaches of confidentiality and privacy.186 An identity scheme that
employs mass surveillance impairs an individual’s autonomy and
self-development and violates the constitutional protection of privacy and human dignity.187 There is no telling how the Indian government will handle such information or the political and personal
consequences of government misuse of such large quantities of personal data.188
As Justice Chandrachud explained in Puttaswamy I, “informational control empowers the individual to use privacy as a shield to
retain personal control over information pertaining to the person.”189
As per his opinion, information can be collected subject to three requirements: (1) legality—there should be the existence of law; (2)
need—the aim of the law for which information is being collected
is reasonable; and (3) proportionality—“the means which are
adopted by the legislature are proportional to the object and needs
sought to be fulfilled by the law.”190
It is essential to analyze these requirements in relation to the
Aadhaar Act. As previously discussed, section 7 of the Act states
that in order to establish identity as a “condition for receipt of a subsidy, benefit or service,” the central or state government may “require that such an individual undergo authentication, or furnish
proof of possession of an Aadhaar number.”191 This provision opens
the door for the government to require Aadhaar registration for beneficiaries, which the Supreme Court has already pushed against.192
Additionally, the Act was passed in Parliament as a money bill
(a draft law that contains provisions concerning the regulation of a
tax, lending money to the Government of India, or withdrawal of
186
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money from the Consolidated Fund of India), which has been challenged as unconstitutional because the Act contains provisions unrelated to government taxation and expenditure.193 This leads us to
question Justice Chandrachud’s first requirement—is the Act even
legal?194 According to the recent September 2018 Indian Supreme
Court decision in Puttaswamy II, it is.195 In the judgment, the Court
declared that Aadhaar could legally be brought in as a money bill.196
Nevertheless, it is essential to consider the Act’s need and proportionality, which are directly related to requirements two and
three. While the aim of the Act is a reasonable one—to provide
every Indian with a unique identity number that enables a fair and
equitable distribution of benefits and subsidies—the use of biometric information is not a reasonable means of data collection.
Along with being unreasonable, the means of data collection are not
proportional to the object or needs of the law.
C. Biometric Data Collection
Biometric information is the collection of data that is intrinsic to
each person, such as fingerprints, retina scans, voice analysis, DNA
analysis, or facial recognition.197 The appeal of biometric information is that it is hard to falsify; however, there are serious concerns on the efficacy of biometric analysis.198 The technology is not
foolproof—any biometric authentication process is prone to error.199
For example, manual laborers may encounter problems with fingerprint scanning, as their hands may be worn or change over time.200
In fact, fingerprint scanning has a false rejection rate of eleven percent (11%).201
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Because biometric schemes are expensive, there is a greater tendency towards data sharing among organizations, leading to a larger
interconnected web of personal information.202 Even though other
countries have implemented successful ID card schemes, most do
not use biometric identifiers or have multiple applications.203 UIDAI
can still reach its goal of creating a database of every Indian citizen
with the use of demographic information. Other options include
storing biometric information on an offline terminal, where the information is not stored in a single centralized online database, or
using smartcards, where biometric information is kept directly on
the card itself.204 These alternatives present fewer security concerns
and are more reasonable methods of data collection and storage.205
D. Constitutional Challenge Analysis
Contrary to the Indian Supreme Court’s findings in Puttaswamy
I and II, the Aadhaar system is unconstitutional and a violation of
privacy rights. Informational privacy is a facet of the right to privacy.206 While there exists a sensitive balance between individual
interests and legitimate concerns of the state, the Indian government
would have a difficult time establishing a compelling state interest
that would outweigh the protection of privacy rights. A legitimate
aim of the state would include, for instance, protecting national security, preventing and investigating crime, encouraging innovation
and the spread of knowledge, and/or preventing the dissipation of
social welfare benefits.207 While these state interests are of importance, a constitutionally protected right should take precedence
over such state aims.
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While it has been argued that the Aadhaar Act violates the Indian
Constitution under Article 14 (right to equal protection),208 Article
19(1)(d) (right to move freely),209 Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice
any profession, occupation, trade or business),210 and Article 21
(right to life and personal liberty),211 the Indian Supreme Court has
declared the Act constitutional. Article 141 of the Indian Constitution states the following: “The law declared by the Supreme Court
shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.”212 This
ensures that the Supreme Court of India may pass a decree or order
as is necessary for doing justice in any cause or matter before it, and
any decree or order passed is enforceable throughout all of India.213
However, despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s ruling is
binding, Article 13(2) of the Indian Constitution may provide a legal
mechanism to declare the Aadhaar Act unconstitutional. Article
13(2) declares that “the State shall not make any law which takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by [Part III (Fundamental
Rights)] and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to
the extent of the contravention, be void.”214 Therefore, a law that
enables the collection of identity data without adequate safeguards
violates the right to privacy under Article 21 (which is included in
Part III of the Indian Constitution) and should be declared void under Article 13(2). Under this analysis, the Act should have been declared unconstitutional by the Puttaswamy I court.
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E. New Legislative Proposals
Even though the Aadhar Act has been declared constitutional,
there should be safeguards to the system. The portions of the Puttaswamy I judgment that discuss data protection and privacy state
that “any collection of personal information that would impact privacy must have a law to back it.”215 Accordingly, in order to ensure
the success of Aadhaar, India must pass comprehensive privacy legislation that provides “judicial remedies and other enforcement
mechanisms for preventing privacy violations.”216 Considering that
the right to privacy has been declared a protected right under the
Indian Constitution, this task should be made easier.217
New legislation should include the following: (1) methods for
which individuals can object to the use of certain personal information; (2) explanations regarding exactly how personal information is going to be used; (3) third party oversight of UIDAI; (4)
transparency of new developments, practices, and policies; and (5)
prompt judicial review of situations where information was improperly used or obtained. 218
Additionally, different agencies and service providers should be
prevented from data sharing. The interloping of data between organizations would leave an electronic trail of an individual’s activities
and records and allow information collected for one purpose to be
used for altogether different purposes.219 For example, interlinking
of databases could occur if, when applying for a job, an employer
could access medical records, banking information, or voter registration of a potential employee. Personal data should be limited or
kept relevant to its purpose and used to the extent necessary for that
purpose. Finally, individuals should be able to request and obtain
information concerning their personal data and have a means of
challenging that data. If the challenge is successful, the data should
be modified or erased.
215
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF AN AADHAAR-LIKE SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States has historically rejected attempts to create a
national ID system.220 While the United States does issue Social Security numbers and stores biometric information in the criminal database, there is no universal biometric database from which to pull
information.221 With the growth of interconnected technology, it is
important to address the consequences of a system like Aadhaar in
the United States if an equivalent system were to be implemented.
Because an Aadhaar ID is technically voluntary for privatized
services, it is essential to consider how disclosing personal information to a third party affects one’s privacy rights. Even though the
Aadhaar Act provides certain safeguards,222 there are risks associated with the voluntary disclosure of information. For example, in
United States v. Miller, it was determined that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in bank records disclosed to a third party
when done in the ordinary course of business.223 In that case, the
government was able to gain access to the individual’s bank records
even though they were confidential.224 Similarly, voluntarily disclosing information to an agency like UIDAI may waive any reasonable expectation of privacy.
While the United States government may assert that the voluntary
disclosure of information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, one can argue that, in practice, the use of a national ID card
may not actually be voluntary. As seen with the Aadhaar cards, the
government can require ID cards to be mandatory in order to access
certain welfare services or file income tax returns. When considering the services that demand an Aadhaar card, such disclosure of
information is not voluntary in any meaningful sense of the word,
but a requirement. Therefore, unlike the holding in Miller, the U.S.
220
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government would fail in arguing that voluntarily providing information to a third party in order to obtain an ID card should not be
granted Fourth Amendment protections.
If a national ID system were to be implemented in the United
States, the government would be able to gain access to an individual’s confidential information (even the Aadhaar Act has a provision
that allows disclosure of information in the “interest of national security”).225 Access to such information would implicate the Fourth
Amendment, as there is a reasonable expectation of privacy when
disclosing personal information.226 As Justice Sotomayor stated in
United States v. Jones, “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”227 The government’s use of personal information to monitor someone’s actions, habits, and communication is a violation of
the Fourth Amendment unless the Amendment’s requirements were
satisfied, as it creates a comprehensive picture of that person’s
life.228
The gathering of biometric information into large databases has
been a growing concern in the United States.229 It has been argued
that biometric ID cards contain information so personal to one’s
body (iris scans, facial recognition, and fingerprints), that protection
extends beyond one’s body and to the cards, making a violation of a
card’s information a personal privacy violation.230 In 2017, the Indian Supreme Court considered two writ petitions pending before it
concerning the right to bodily autonomy, claiming the collection of
biometric information under Aadhaar constitutes bodily intrusion
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under Article 21.231 The petitions argued that unless there is a compelling state interest, such as identifying a murder suspect or border
control, the use of biometric information should be narrowly tailored
and not be permitted as a “24/7 tracking system.”232 Because of the
potential misuse of biometric information, certain states in the
United States have enacted privacy laws protecting the collection
and use of biometric information by companies.233 While the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Customs and Border Patrol have
been permitted to collect and access biometric information, there has
yet to be a nationwide collection system.234
Data sharing is also an issue, as data commoditization has created an entire industry around the buying and selling of personal information.235 As stated in Riley v. California (which extended
Fourth Amendment protection to cell phones), technology allows
individuals to carry massive amounts of data that is stored in one
central location, such as a cell phone.236 Similarly, information that
is gathered and stored in one centralized database and shared between agencies and service providers should also be afforded Fourth
Amendment protections. A centralized database is similar to a cell
phone—large amounts of information are stored in one location,
giving the government free reign to use and explore that data. Not
only is this information at risk in the state’s hands, but private actors
may be able to gain access to the database via hacking, such as the
recent reports of unauthorized access of the UIDAI system.237
Normalization of the collection, use, and synchronization of data
is dangerous. When citizens become accustomed to the government
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requiring the collection of sensitive personal data, they become desensitized to the experience.238 It then becomes the norm for the state
to monitor and collect information about one’s life and preferences,
leading to an Orwellian239 way of life where state surveillance is
omnipresent.240 It is essential to a democratic form of government
to allow citizens to speak their mind and dissent without fear of retribution from the state.241 If the public fears the monitoring and storing of their views, they will engage in self-censorship and be less
likely to express a “contrarian or controversial view point.”242
Additionally, private actors may take advantage of such a system. For example, one wealthy neighborhood in India requires all
labor and domestic workers to have an Aadhaar card.243 The residents felt it was a cheaper and more reliable way of controlling surveillance of the neighborhood, rather than a police verification process. 244 However, allowing private actors to take on a police role
could lead to discrimination, isolation, and profiling of minority
groups.
The implementation of a national ID system in the United States
would have grave consequences to personal privacy rights. The
Aadhaar system should serve as a lesson to the United States about
how a purportedly “pro-poor, pro-development,” and “anti-corruption” mechanism can result in mass surveillance, mandatory enrollment, and dangerous hacking.245 To maintain a liberal democratic
society that values and upholds privacy rights, the United States
238
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should avoid proposing such a system, no matter how beneficial and
convenient it may seem.
CONCLUSION
In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court considered several petitions
submitted in prior years addressing the mandatory use of Aadhaar
and the overarching matter of citizens’ right to privacy.246 In the
2018 Puttaswamy II judgment, the Court declared Aadhaar to be
constitutional and ruled that Aadhaar can be a mandatory requirement for government services.247 However, the mandatory linkage
of Aadhaar numbers to bank accounts and other private services is
unconstitutional.248 If the Indian Supreme Court had stricken down
the Aadhaar Act as an unconstitutional violation of privacy rights,
the Act might have been amended and re-implemented with greater
privacy protections. By the Court permitting the mandatory linkage
of Aadhaar to government services, the program will become the
most essential and pervasive identity proof in India—the one number that connects citizens and residents to all governmental agencies.249 While Aadhaar may create a more efficient distribution of
services, it also exposes a vast number of Indians to cybercrime and
potential privacy violations.250
However, considering that most Indians have already registered
for Aadhaar,251 the government may continue to incentivize
Aadhaar linkages by creating persuasive and innovative ways to encourage the voluntary linkage of Aadhaar identities to private
schemes. Even if this is the case, universal Aadhaar participation
would not be the grimmest outcome (considering the benefits that
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Aadhaar does provide),252 as long as there are efficient and reliable
privacy measures to protect identity information and prevent mass
surveillance by the Indian government.
The Indian Supreme Court’s analysis of the right to privacy in
the Indian Constitution is one step toward the implementation of
more specific and enforceable privacy laws in India. Having a flexible and resilient interpretation of the Indian Constitution will allow
future generations to address the concerns of a system such as
Aadhaar. As rapid technological growth may render obsolete many
present notions of privacy and security, laws must be able to evolve
with the necessities and concerns of the time.
The Aadhaar system is fast becoming mandatory for government
services in India for citizens and noncitizen residents alike. Community and government leaders can and should demand effective
data privacy legislation to prevent the Orwellian253 outcome of mass
surveillance, data collection, and state intrusion. As more and more
citizens become conditioned to accepting state intrusion into their
lives, they run the risk of normalizing government data collection
for possibly unconstitutional purposes.254 Therefore, effective legislative solutions should include third-party oversight, judicial review,
and transparent disclosures of information distribution.
These core elements of privacy will—at minimum—remove incentives to impose even more personally invasive methods of data
collection and monitoring. This visceral loss of privacy weakens autonomy, leads to greater self-censorship, and increases risks for
identity theft, profiling, and discrimination.255 Losing privacy protections implicates cores values enshrined in the Constitutions of India and the United States. Hopefully, the United States will gain insight from the Aadhaar decisions in India and, if the United States
does decide to implement a similar system, it should do so with privacy protections in mind.
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